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FOREWORD
In November 2014, tense negotiations over the status of Iran’s nuclear program resulted in a 7-month
extension of a compliance deadline. In June 2015,
negotiators will once again be grappling with the
same intractable issues, where neither Iran nor the
United States and its allies appear able to make the
substantive concessions that would be necessary for a
permanent agreement.
This monograph, completed ahead of the November 2014 deadline, examines some of the underlying
factors which will be constant in dealing with Iran under President Hassan Rouhani, and which will help
determine the success or failure of talks in 2015. It
surveys Rouhani’s eventful first year in office in order
to provide pointers to what may be possible—and to
some key limiting factors—for Iran under his leadership. During that time, Rouhani was forced to balance
his own progressive instincts with the instinctual caution of more conservative elements of the Iranian ruling elite. As a result, foreign hopes for his influence
on Iran’s place in the world have moved from initial
optimism to a more sober assessment of the options
available to him.
This monograph provides an essential backdrop to
the forthcoming renewed negotiations by providing
an introduction to the complex interplay of issues and
interests which constrain the Iranian leadership. The
Strategic Studies Institute recommends it not only to
researchers and policymakers with an interest in Iran,
but also, given Iran’s central role in a number of cur-
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rent Middle Eastern security issues, to those working
with the Middle East more broadly.
			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
At the end of September 2014, Iranian President
Hassan Rouhani made his second appearance at the
United Nations General Assembly in New York. His
previous visit, in September 2013, had seen the first
telephone conversation between a U.S. President and
an Iranian leader since 1979. Despite the domestic
controversy it caused in Iran, the fact that this was possible was indicative of the significant changes in Iranian foreign policy that had already taken place since
Rouhani’s election as Iranian president, replacing
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
President Barack Obama noted that, “I think this
new president is not going to suddenly make it easy,”1
but the prospects for a significant easing of tensions
with Iran appeared good. Since his election, the new
president had sent conciliatory messages to a range of
Western governments, as well as to neighboring Arab
Gulf countries, and in particular seemed willing to
take a different approach on nuclear negotiations to
that of Ahmadinejad. Nevertheless, President Obama
still felt it necessary to specify that direct military action by the United States against Iran remained an
option: “Iran should avoid thinking that the United
States would not launch a military strike in response
to Tehran’s nuclear program just because it has not
attacked Syria. . . . They shouldn’t draw a lesson that
we . . . won’t strike Iran.”2
One year later, Rouhani returned to New York
under entirely different circumstances. The option
of military strikes in response to Iran’s nuclear ambitions had given way to stalemate over the extension
of a groundbreaking agreement between Iran and the
West that had seemed to promise a peaceful resolu-
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tion. Despite positive movement, the intervening
year had clearly demonstrated the limited freedom
of movement of the president in improving external
relations—there was no prospect in 2014 of anything
so daring as a telephone conversation with President
Obama.3 A deadline for reaching further agreement
on the status of Iran’s nuclear program was close, and
the consequences of failure to reach this agreement
seemed alarming.
This monograph reviews the period since Rouhani’s election in terms of these shifts in what seems
possible and achievable for Iran, in order to draw conclusions about the likely future vectors for Iranian foreign policy. Although external relations regionally and
internationally feature prominently on the agenda of
the new Iranian leadership, they cannot be separated
from Iran’s domestic issues. Key junctures throughout Rouhani’s first year of office emphasize that Iran
is not a monolithic political body. The Iranian regime
is constituted of a variety of political forces, and their
influence on both nuclear negotiations and foreign
policy more broadly is significant and pervasive. Any
new approach adopted by an incoming Iranian President thus results from a shift in the thinking of other
influential Iranian institutions, stemming from internal pressure. President Rouhani’s initiatives enjoy the
support of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, but this support is qualified and may have a
limited duration.
ENDNOTES
1. Laura Rozen, “Obama Corresponds with Iran’s Rouhani, Holds Out Hope for Nuclear Deal,” Al-Monitor, September 15, 2013, available from backchannel.al-monitor.com/index.
php/2013/09/6265/obama-says-exchanged-lettters-with-irans-rouhani/.

x

2. “Obama Says Syria Deal Could Offer Lesson for Iran Talks,”
Reuters, September 15, 2014, available from www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/15/us-syria-crisis-usa-idUSBRE98D09C20130915.
3. “Rouhani: Time Not Right for Another Phone Call with
Obama,” The Times of Israel, September 27, 2014, available from
www.timesofisrael.com/rouhani-time-not-right-for-another-phone-callwith-obama.
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PROSPECTS FOR IRAN’S NEW DIRECTION
Introduction.
At the end of September 2014, Iranian President
Hassan Rouhani made his second appearance at the
United Nations (UN) General Assembly in New York.
His previous visit, in September 2013, had seen the
first telephone conversation between a U.S. President
and an Iranian leader since 1979. Despite the domestic controversy it caused in Iran, the fact that this
was possible was indicative of the significant changes in Iranian foreign policy that had already taken
place since Rouhani’s election as Iranian president,
replacing Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
President Barack Obama noted that, “I think
this new president is not going to suddenly make it
easy”1—but the prospects for a significant easing of
tensions with Iran appeared good. Since his election,
the new president had sent conciliatory messages to
a range of Western governments, as well as to neighboring Arab Gulf countries, and in particular seemed
willing to take a different approach on nuclear negotiations to that of Ahmadinejad. Nevertheless, Obama
still felt it necessary to specify that direct military
action by the United States against Iran remained
an option, he said:
Iran should avoid thinking that the United States
would not launch a military strike in response to Tehran’s nuclear program just because it has not attacked
Syria. . . . They shouldn’t draw a lesson that we . . .
won’t strike Iran.2

One year later, Rouhani returned to New York
under entirely different circumstances. The option
1

of military strikes in response to Iran’s nuclear ambitions had given way to stalemate over the extension
of a groundbreaking agreement between Iran and the
West that had seemed to promise a peaceful resolution. Despite positive movement, the intervening
year had clearly demonstrated the limited freedom
of movement of the Iranian president in improving
external relations—there was no prospect in 2014 of
anything so daring as a telephone conversation with
Obama.3 A deadline for reaching further agreement
on the status of Iran’s nuclear program was close, and
the consequences of failure to reach this agreement
seemed alarming.
This monograph reviews the period since Rouhani’s election in terms of these shifts in what seems
possible and achievable for Iran, in order to draw conclusions about the likely future vectors for Iranian foreign policy. Although external relations regionally and
internationally feature prominently on the agenda of
the new Iranian leadership, they cannot be separated
from Iran’s domestic issues. Key junctures throughout Rouhani’s first year of office emphasize that Iran
is not a monolithic political body. The Iranian regime
is constituted of a variety of political forces, and their
influence on both nuclear negotiations and foreign
policy more broadly is significant and pervasive. Any
new approach adopted by an incoming Iranian president thus results from a shift in the thinking of other
influential Iranian institutions, stemming from internal pressure. Rouhani’s initiatives enjoy the support
of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, but this
support is qualified and may have a limited duration.
It follows that in order to assess the current prospects
for maintaining Iran’s trajectory toward cooperative
engagement and compromise, we need to begin with
the manner of Rouhani’s arrival in office.
2

Retrospective: An Unexpected Victory.
June 2013 marked an unexpected turn of events
in Iranian politics, one that even some of the most
optimistic commentators and analysts had failed to
predict. Hassan Rouhani—a moderate and pragmatist cleric whose views on individual freedom, social
issues and foreign policy diverged substantially from
the ultra-conservative political establishment of the
Islamic Republic—won a landslide victory in an election which many thought would be boycotted by the
majority of Iranians supporting change and reform in
the country’s political system.
This result was highly significant, for a number
of reasons:
•	Rouhani was the only candidate representing
pro-reform policies, against five conservative
rivals.
•	The election was held against the backdrop of
the biggest political unrest the Islamic Republic
had experienced since its victory in 1979. The
Green Movement, which erupted across the
country following the disputed 2009 presidential election resulting in Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s second term in office, had been suppressed
by the regime, leaving the country divided and
pro-reform voices in isolation.
•	Opposition leaders Mir Hossein Mousavi and
Mehdi Karroubi, the two reformist candidates
of the 2009 election who led the subsequent
street protests, had been placed under house
arrest by the authorities since 2011.
•	Some members of the public who had taken
part in the protests felt disillusioned with the
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political system, believing that the elite would
rig any further election if they saw fit. Therefore, there were widespread calls for boycotting
the election. Many opposition and pro-reform
forces were of the belief that taking part in the
election would be a betrayal of Mousavi and
Karroubi and would only strengthen the ultraconservative establishment.
Nevertheless, nearly 37 million eligible Iranians
voted in the election, an unexpected turnout of 72 percent. Rouhani, who had the backing of former presidents Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani and Mohammad
Khatami, secured 51 percent of the votes, putting him
well above the second candidate Mohammad Bagher
Ghalibaf, the mayor of Tehran, with 16 percent.4
During election rallies, Rouhani had promised his
supporters to find a way to end international sanctions
against the Iranian economy, which had halved its oil
revenues, thus bringing the economy to its knees. This
new direction in international relations for Iran was
signaled without delay. In a press conference 3 days
after his victory, Rouhani pledged to resolve confrontation over Iran’s nuclear program through “constructive interaction” with the world. He said that Iran was
ready to show “more transparency” on its nuclear activities, while still ruling out suspension of uranium
enrichment procedures. Most Western powers “cautiously” welcomed the change of tone in the Iranian
president’s remarks, which were in direct contrast to
Ahmadinejad’s aggressive and often hostile rhetoric
toward the West.5
Rouhani was sworn into office on August 4, 2013.
In his first speech as president in the Iranian parliament, the Majlis, Rouhani urged the West to use the
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“language of respect,” rather than sanctions, toward
Iran.6 At the same time, he said that amending ties
with regional neighbors would be his first priority in
foreign policy, after relations with many Arab countries, prominently Saudi Arabia, had worsened under
Ahmadinejad.7
Syria: The First Challenge.
This ambition was immediately put to the test by
the civil war in Syria. While Rouhani was still busy
forming his cabinet and proposing his ministers to the
Majlis, the United States and other Western powers
accused President Bashar al-Assad’s forces of having
used chemical weapons, which had previously been
defined as a “red line” by U.S. President Obama.8 The
result was the highest likelihood to date of a U.S. strike
on Syria.
As Iran’s key ally in the region, Syria is instrumental in what Iran calls “the resistance front against the
Zionist regime,”9 primarily through support for the
Lebanese Hezbollah. Therefore, Iran had defied global
outrage against the Syrian government and President
Bashar al-Assad since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, knowing that the departure of Assad would leave
allies weaker and more vulnerable against Israel and
the West.
Iran and Israel.
Iran has had no relations with “the Zionist regime,” otherwise known as Israel, since the Islamic
revolution in 1979. Israel is regarded as “an occupying
regime” that has waged war on Muslims. The founder
of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Ruhollah
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Khomeyni, referred to Israel as “a cancerous tumor”;
and “liberation of Bayt al-Muqaddas,” an Iranian term
for Jerusalem, is considered one of the objectives of
the Islamic revolution.10
Public remarks by former President Ahmadinejad in 2005, to the effect that Israel should be “wiped
off the map,” did little to improve the atmosphere.11
The two countries are prone to confrontational verbal exchanges, and the threat of Israeli air strikes
on Iran’s nuclear facilities became serious during
Ahmadinejad’s presidency.
Immediately after taking office, President Rouhani
said that his administration would do all it could to
prevent a possible U.S. strike on Syria. He acknowledged that chemical weapons had been used in Syria,
but refused to blame government forces.12 The Iranian
authorities—backed by some major powers such as
Russia—maintained that it was the rebels, backed by
Western powers, who had used these weapons, in order to provide a pretext for the United States to attack
the Assad government.
This challenge, at the very start of Rouhani’s presidency, provided an immediate confirmation of the
continuing factionalism of Iranian politics, and the undiminished influence of hard-liners. While Supreme
Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei confined himself to
saying that the United States would “suffer loss” if
it chose to attack Syria,13 some conservative elements
within the establishment went as far as threatening
that any U.S. strike against Syria would result in retaliatory attacks on Israel. Chief of Staff of the Iranian
Armed Forces, Major-General Hassan Firouzabadi,
stated that “any military measure against Syria will
draw the Zionists deep into the fire [as well].”14
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If this threat had become reality, Israel, far more
accessible than the United States, would have been
Iran’s main target. While unlikely to directly wage
war on Israel, Iran could have used the militias of its
proxies in the region, like Hezbollah and Hamas. With
the undoubted influence of hardliners on Iranian action, despite presidential rhetoric, any strike on Syria
could therefore have set the stage for full-scale hostilities in the region.
At the same time, while Russia’s intervention in
producing a plan for removal of chemical weapons
from Syria prevented a potential war, Iranian influence also played a significant role in the eventual
peaceful resolution. Iran exerted regional sway and
maintained a stance which was more or less in line
with that of Russia, making sure that in keeping with
its strategic interest of saving its key ally Syria from
war, it had backing from a significant partner like
Russia if the United States went ahead with strikes.
In Iranian and Russian perceptions, the combination
of strong diplomatic maneuvering and the threat of
action against Israel was successful in constraining the
United States. Rouhani thus headed to New York for
his first UN General Assembly session buoyed by the
news that a potential disaster in his first year in office
had been successfully averted.
Breakthrough in Nuclear Talks.
From the beginning of his presidency, Rouhani
made it clear that finding a resolution to the nuclear
standoff with the West and easing the sanctions on the
Iranian people was his main focus in foreign policy.
Although Iran under Ahmadinejad had attended a
few rounds of talks with the European Union (EU), the
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two sides seemed to have reached a deadlock, with no
short-term solution in sight.
This changed quickly under the new administration. Rouhani assigned the task of handling nuclear
negotiations to the Foreign Ministry, thus putting Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif in charge. Before that, nuclear negotiations had been in the charge
of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, a council
headed by the president whose members are directly
appointed by the Supreme Leader. Rouhani appeared
to have taken this decision for two reasons: 1) He
would have direct supervision on the progress of the
nuclear talks; and 2) He trusted his personal friend,
Zarif, to push Rouhani’s agenda forward. Zarif, a veteran diplomat, had served in a range of posts in the
Foreign Ministry. Educated in the United States, he
had been Iran’s permanent representative at the UN
for several years and retained good connections with
a large number of senior foreign diplomats.
It should be noted that despite this change, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei maintains the final
say in all decisions regarding the nuclear program. It
appeared that Rouhani had been given approval by
Khamenei to move nuclear issues forward with a
more open, transparent, and engaging agenda after
2 years of international sanctions had hit the Iranian
economy hard.
Rouhani’s nuclear maneuverings started as early
as September 2013, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York. Zarif held a meeting
with all the foreign ministers of the P5+1 (the five
permanent members of the UN Security Council:
the United States, the United Kingdom (UK), France,
Russia, and China, plus Germany) and EU foreign
policy chief Catherine Ashton. The meeting itself al-
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ready constituted an unprecedented breakthrough,
as most major Western countries had refused to hold
high-ranking meetings with Iranian officials during
Ahmadinejad’s presidency.
Zarif then held a bilateral meeting with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry to discuss the nuclear issue, which made headlines the world over and represented a real change in Iranian foreign policy. This
too was a first; with very few exceptions, direct negotiations with American officials had been a taboo in
Iranian politics.
Iran and the P5+1 set out a platform in New York
for further rounds of talks in the upcoming months.
The two sides met in Geneva, Switzerland, in October
the same year, but despite apparent progress, failed to
agree on a deal. All the same, some Western diplomats
attending the talks stated that they had seen “the most
serious, intense” negotiations ever held with Iran.15
The response to these new developments within
Iran confirmed the support for Rouhani’s initiative
from Ayatollah Khamenei. Opposition to the talks
included hardliners opposed to Rouhani’s “soft tone”
on the West, who let it be known that they were “concerned” the government would offer significant concessions to the West for a deal. This was dismissed by
Ayatollah Khamenei, who showed unequivocal backing for the talks: “No one should accuse our negotiating team of reconciling or compromising. These are
our own children, the children of the revolution, who
are doing a very difficult task.”16
Even with the backing of Khamenei, Rouhani had
to ensure his negotiating team would not cross the
Islamic Republic’s immutable red lines. Khamenei,
meanwhile, insured his position by making it clear
that he was not optimistic about the outcome of the
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negotiations “because the Americans are not honest
in talks and cannot be trusted.”17 This would allow
Khamenei the best of both worlds; if the talks failed to
reach a resolution he would tell the nation that he was
pessimistic from the very beginning, and if the two
sides did agree to a deal, he could say that it was he
who allowed the Rouhani administration to go all-out
to secure it.
The real breakthrough, though, took place in November 2013 in Geneva. After marathon talks which
included all the foreign ministers of the six world
powers, Iran and the P5+1 agreed on a ground-breaking 6-month deal on November 24, which they named
the “Joint Plan of Action.”18 Iran agreed to curb some
aspects of its nuclear program in return for relief
from some sanctions. After the deal came into effect
on January 20, 2014, the two sides would then engage
in further negotiations to find a comprehensive solution which would effectively resolve the decade-long
standoff between Tehran and the West. July 20 was
chosen as the deadline for agreeing to a comprehensive resolution. According to one assessment, the key
factor in reaching the agreement was a decision by
both sides to isolate nuclear negotiations from other
contentious issues.19 This allowed progress without
either side’s negotiating position falling hostage to
external considerations.
The impact of the agreement within Iran was entirely in keeping with its groundbreaking nature. The
picture of Zarif shaking hands with Kerry after the
deal had been agreed upon made the front page of the
majority of Iranian papers the following day. The news
was announced in Iran by the president himself, who
hailed it as “a victory for the Iranian nation.” Rouhani
said that, as a result of the Geneva deal, the “archi-
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tecture of sanctions had cracked,” and urged foreign
investors to travel to Iran and use the opportunity
to trade with Iranian businesses.20 On their return to
Tehran, the negotiating team led by Zarif was mobbed
by crowds celebrating the fact that their country had
managed to strike a deal with the West.21
Predictably enough, however, while it seemed that
the Joint Plan of Action deal had the backing of the
majority of Iranians, it made the hardline and ultraconservative campaigners more vocal in their criticism. They believed that Iran had given up too much
for too little, some of them going as far as to say that
Rouhani and the negotiating team had “betrayed our
nuclear martyrs”—a reference to the assassinations of
a number of Iranian nuclear scientists, for which Iran
holds Israel responsible.22
Restarting Regional Relations.
President Rouhani’s next foreign policy target following the nuclear deal in Geneva was active diplomacy in Iran’s immediate neighborhood. Some Arab
states had expressed their concern about Iran’s nuclear program in the past, specifically under Ahmadinejad’s hardline administration. Now, with an interim
deal in hand, Rouhani could start rebuilding relations
with regional states. Zarif began an intensive round
of diplomatic visits. He visited Kuwait and Oman,
and met his counterparts from Turkey and the United
Arab Emirates (UAE) in Tehran. Zarif even expressed
willingness to make a visit to Saudi Arabia.23
Iran had offered unconditional support to President Bashar al-Assad since the beginning of the civil
war in Syria in 2011. The issue was an obstacle to
relations with several countries in the region. Now,
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although the Syrian crisis was still at the heart of
Tehran’s diplomatic efforts, Iran also hoped that rectifying its disturbed relations with regional states
would pave the way for reaching a lasting agreement
with the West on the nuclear issue—bearing in mind
that several Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, are
perceived as key U.S. allies in the region.
Talks with Turkey were held in attempts to address the Syria issue. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet
Davutoglu travelled to Tehran to attend the 21st meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) in November 2013, and
held a joint press conference with his Iranian counterpart, Zarif, which reported progress. “We have shared
stances on many issues and also some differences on
the crisis in Syria and we hope that we can resolve
these differences with the help of each other,” Zarif
said.24 Davutoglu further announced that Rouhani
would visit Turkey in January 2014.
With Arab states in the region, the main focus
besides direct bilateral relations was to address concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. UAE Foreign
Minister Shaykh Abdallah Bin-Zayid Al Nuhayyan
arrived in Tehran on November 28 on a rare official 1-day visit. The two countries have had a long
dispute over a number of bilateral issues, including
sovereignty over three islands in the Persian Gulf. In
his meeting with Zarif, Al Nuhayyan and his Iranian
counterpart called for opening a new chapter in bilateral ties. Zarif followed up with a visit to Kuwait and
Oman. Relations between Iran and Kuwait had been
strained for the previous 3 years, after accusations of
Iranian espionage activities in Kuwait. Meanwhile,
the Omani Sultan was the first foreign head of state
to visit Tehran after Rouhani took office. Oman was
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reportedly instrumental in making possible Iran’s
nuclear deal with the P5+1, thanks to months of secret
talks between U.S. and Iranian officials in the Omani
capital, Muscat.25
Iran and Saudi Arabia have been rivals over past
decades, both aspiring to be the major power in the
Persian Gulf. In addition to Iran’s disputed nuclear
programs, the two oil-rich states were at loggerheads
over influence in some other countries including Iraq,
Bahrain, and Syria. Saudis consider Iran-U.S. rapprochement as a risk which might disturb the balance
of power in the region in favor of Iran.26 As a consequence, Saudi Arabia had expressed concerns about
the nuclear talks in Geneva. Despite these concerns,
Saudi Arabia cautiously welcomed the deal with the
P5+1, calling it “a first step towards a solution if there
are good intentions.”27
Rouhani had indicated in his first press conference
after the June elections that amending ties with Saudi
Arabia would be a priority for the new government.
This reflects the fact that better relations with regional
states would facilitate striking a long-term deal with
the West. According to a front-page article in the reformist Sharq daily in November 2013:
If instead of disturbing our diplomatic ties with the
influential countries in the region and world such as
Saudi Arabia, France and Britain we had made efforts
to minimize the number of our obstinate enemies, we
would not have reached a point where our numberone enemy [the U.S.] would be ready for a deal but
other states overturn the table.28

Iran is also cognizant of Saudi influence both in the
region, such as through the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and in broader international organizations,
13

such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)
and the Arab League. Potentially, reaching an agreement with Saudi Arabia over a number of disputed
regional issues could help both sides to maintain their
position in the region. A visit by Zarif, or by former
President Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, known to have
good relations with Saudi leaders, would explore
channels toward that goal and pave the way for a
possible detente.
Thaw with the UK.
One of the major changes under Rouhani was resumption of ties between Tehran and the UK after relations between the two countries had been at their
lowest level for some considerable time on Rouhani’s
entry into office. Resuming diplomatic ties with the
UK would be considered significant in Tehran due
to Britain’s perceived status as the closest U.S. ally in
Europe, with the potential to act as a bridge between
Tehran and Washington for further developments in
relations. In addition, as a member of the P5+1 group,
the UK was essential to any possible nuclear deal.
In December 2011, the British government had
announced that it was imposing unilateral sanctions
on the Iranian Central Bank. The decision came at the
height of international sanctions on Iran, where Iranian banks and businesses were directly targeted by
the West. In retaliation, the Majlis passed a bill that
restricted relations with Britain to the level of chargé
d’affaires. A few days later, a group of hardline students ransacked the British Embassy and another UK
diplomatic facility in Tehran, chanting “death to Britain.” Despite occasional animosity between the two
countries and regular demonstrations, this was the
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first time the embassy had been actually overrun since
1979.29 In response, UK Foreign Secretary William
Hague closed the embassy, and asked Iranian diplomats in London to return home, a move seconded
by Canada.
Even after these events, Hassan Rouhani was well
placed to rebuild ties; Rouhani had lived in Britain,
and acquired his doctorate from Glasgow Caledonian
University in Scotland. Among his congratulatory
messages on winning the presidential election was
one from UK Prime Minister David Cameron, hoping that ties with Iran would improve on “a step by
step” basis.
Foreign Ministers Zarif and Hague met on the
sidelines of the UN General Assembly session in
New York in September 2013, and agreed to work
toward restoration of diplomatic ties. In October, the
two countries agreed to appoint nonresident chargés
d’affaires, Mohammad Hassan Habibollahzadeh and
Ajay Sharma, who would work toward the reopening
of embassies and full restoration of ties.30 Habibollahzadeh and Sharma met several times in Tehran and
London, both noting that the process was proceeding
positively. Finally, in February 2014, the Iranian embassy building in Kensington, London, reopened and
began offering limited services to Iranian nationals
living in Britain. The British embassy in Tehran remains closed to date, which may reflect the intention
of the British government to await the result of current
nuclear negotiations. A renewed nuclear deal would
likely pave the way for full restoration of diplomatic
ties between the two nations. In this atmosphere, a
meeting in September 2014 between Rouhani and UK
Prime Minister David Cameron on the fringes of the
UN General Assembly, while progressive, was brave
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considering the deep suspicion with which the UK is
regarded in Tehran.31
Ties with the United States, Phone Call with
Obama.
The first sign of change in Iran’s bilateral relations
with the United States came as early as July 2013; in
a press conference, the new president said that Iran
and the United States could not remain enemies forever, and that any thaw in relations would depend on
the way the United States interacted with Iran. Meanwhile, Obama said that he “cautiously” welcomed
the arrival of the new Iranian president, stressing that
doors would be open for Iran if it was serious in taking
on a new approach in relation to its nuclear program.32
This cautious beginning was entirely overshadowed almost 2 months later during Rouhani’s visit to
New York for his first UN General Assembly speech.
Rumors of a possible meeting between Rouhani
and Obama had been circulating in the media. This
would have been a true breakthrough, as no Iranian
president had ever dared even to contemplate aloud
a face-to-face meeting with his counterpart from “the
great Satan,” the root of all evil. Naturally enough,
any direct interaction with Satan would have been
anathema to the Islamic Republic.
Nonetheless, in the early hours of the final day of
Rouhani’s visit to New York, a Twitter account belonging to Rouhani announced in English that he and
Obama had spoken over the phone. This marked the
first such conversation between an Iranian and American leader since the Shah’s departure and the subsequent toppling of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1979. The
phone conversation, and the succession of chummy
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tweets between the two leaders that followed as Rouhani departed for the airport, was hailed as “historic”
by world media, and taken as denoting a serious intent by Rouhani to fix the long broken ties with the
world’s greatest power.
The news also caused enthusiasm and excitement
in Iran, but this was followed swiftly by concern. Only
a few hours later, the tweets which included details of
the phone conversation between Obama and Rouhani
were deleted without explanation. It was suspected
that Rouhani had encountered a significant backlash
from the ultra-conservative elements in the establishment, who considered a major red line had been
crossed by the president.33 Speculation on whether
Ayatollah Khamenei had authorized the conversation
ended when Khamenei stated that despite his support
for the government’s active diplomacy, “some of the
things that happened in New York were not right.”34
The ground-breaking Geneva deal, which was
achieved after direct talks between Iranian and U.S.
negotiators, had raised hopes about the possibility of
the two sides widening talks into bilateral relations.
But once again, the Supreme Leader stressed that the
negotiating team was only allowed to talk to American
representatives about the nuclear issue, and no other
topic was on the table. As a consequence, there has
been little progress in bilateral ties since the historic
phone call and the Geneva deal, despite regular meetings between the two countries’ negotiators as part of
the ongoing nuclear talks.
Iran still accuses the United States of supporting
Israel and creating unrest in the region to serve its
own purposes. The majority of Iranian political figures have repeatedly hinted that any failure to reach
a comprehensive deal on the nuclear program should
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be blamed on the United States, because, they claim,
Washington is derailing the talks with “unreasonable
demands.” Despite media rumors of the possibility of
Tehran and Washington working together to counter
the threat posed by the Islamic State in the region, Iran
has said that it does not need to cooperate with the
United States and would rather work with its regional
allies to fight the Islamic State. Nevertheless, Rouhani’s 2014 UN General Assembly speech appeared
to offer a specific invitation for cooperation against
the Islamic State, conditional on progress in nuclear
negotiations. He said:
If our interlocutors are motivated and flexible, we can
reach a longstanding agreement within the time remaining. Then an entirely different environment will
emerge for cooperation at regional and international
levels, for example in combating violence and extremism in the region.35

Seyed Hossein Mousavian, former head of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, suggests that without active
Iranian support, no major peace effort in the Middle
East can succeed—with particular reference to support for the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State.
His suggestion for achieving this, as well as detailed
recommendations for a roadmap for nuclear negotiations, is engagement with Iran, recognizing and accepting the extent of Iranian power and influence in
the region.36
Iran and the Islamic State.
Iran has made it obvious that it takes the threat of
the Islamic State very seriously, although at the same
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time shrugging off any concern about being targeted
by Islamic State militants. Iran has suggested that
the best way to counter the Islamic State is to leave
it to the governments in Iraq and Syria. This reflects
a suspicion of any foreign intervention, based on
awareness of the possible risks to Iranian ally Assad.
Despite this declaratory policy, photographs of General Ghasem Soleimani of the Islamic Revolutionary
Guards Corps (IRGC) have been circulated via social
media showing him alongside Shia Iraqi fighters combating the Islamic State. Whether he has put together
his own force to fight the Islamic State, or he is merely
providing assistance is unspecified in open sources,
but this would reflect the unlikelihood of Iran actually
being willing to leave constraint of the Islamic State to
Iraq and Syria’s own efforts as claimed, which would
inevitably allow the Islamic State to subdue still more
territory.37 A possible trip by Zarif or even Rouhani
himself to Saudi Arabia, which is appearing increasingly likely, would present an opportunity to discuss
ways to fight the Islamic State, or come to an agreement on the possibility of Tehran taking part in some
form of a coalition against the Islamic State, with or
without the United States.
Outlook: Relations with Saudi Arabia and Turkey.
Iran will necessarily be a key player in any eventual resolution of the Syrian conflict, whether political or military, notwithstanding its exclusion from the
Geneva 2 conference in January 2014. Any political
resolution of this kind would entail Iran reaching an
understanding with other key regional players, particularly Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Statements on the
Syria issue by Iranian officials have been very consis-
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tent, and can be read as indicating that Iran sees no
need at present to offer any substantial concessions
or deviations from its declared support for the Assad
government. Thus, there is a potential conflict between Rouhani’s policy of regional engagement and
rapprochement, and the tougher stance of the military establishment which stresses defending Iran’s
strategic interests.
The official government position has been repeatedly articulated by Zarif. He has stressed the need for
a political solution, to be determined by the Syrian
people after the withdrawal of what he has termed
“all foreign forces.”38 Iran would be prepared to use
its influence with Damascus to bring about a ceasefire
and the withdrawal of foreign fighters, Zarif added, if
others used their influence on other combatants with
the same goal. At the same time, he echoed Russian
warnings of the rise of “extremism” in Syria, describing it as “a regional and global menace.”39
This specter of an increase in the global terrorism
threat is also used by Iranian military sources, although more forcibly and with a different emphasis.
This military viewpoint is frequently voiced by Major General Yahya Rahim-Safavi, former head of the
IRGC and now military adviser to Ayatollah Khamenei. In February 2014, Rahim-Safavi said that the extremist “takfiri” groups operating in Syria had been
“masterminded by the United States while financially
supported by the Zionist regime and certain Arab
states.”40 Previously, he had warned that some Arab
kingdoms could disappear by the year 2030.41
Any decision to improve ties with Saudi Arabia
in particular would need to be taken by the Supreme
Leader himself, with input from military as well
as government and diplomatic figures. This would
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account for the fact that no official ministerial visit has
yet taken place, despite statements of readiness. A recent Saudi decree criminalizing citizens going to fight
in foreign countries, and those encouraging them,
could be seen as a first step toward creating a favorable environment for talks with Iran. It could also be
seen as a tacit acknowledgement that the emphasis
on the threat from terrorism stated by Iran, Syria, and
Russia is currently winning the argument.
Iran’s relations with Turkey are much warmer
than those with Saudi Arabia. But a visit to Tehran of
a Turkish delegation headed by the then prime minister Recip Tayyip Erdogan showed that there are still
differences to overcome. A speech Erdogan was due
to give at the Iranian Foreign Ministry was cancelled,
reportedly because his meeting with Rouhani took
longer than scheduled.42 Iranian First Vice-President
Eshaq Jahangiri said at a news conference that agreement had been reached on a natural gas deal. But
Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz then told reporters that there had been a mistranslation, and there
had merely been talks about the deal. Furthermore,
Iranian interest in a resolution in Syria needs to be
placed in context; Syria is subsidiary to the nuclear issue as Iran’s top foreign policy concern. Any efforts
to pave the way for a negotiated solution to the Syria
issue run the risk of falling hostage to the progress of
the nuclear talks. Meanwhile, Iranians feature heavily
among the “foreign forces” active in Syria.

21

The Extent of Iran’s Military Involvement in Syria.
On May 27, 2014, Iranian website Rajanews carried
a very brief report, saying that a commander in the
IRGC, Abdollah Eskandari, had been “martyred” in
Syria. Eskandari’s death attracted little media attention. A commemoration ceremony in his home province of Fars on June 1 was the subject of a 2-minute
report on the local television channel. The ceremony,
and a message of condolence from the country’s
defense minister, was also reported by the Islamic
Republic News Agency (IRNA) and Mehr news
agencies.43
The official Iranian line is that it has no combat
presence on the ground in Syria, although it acknowledges providing military advice and assistance, and
that Iranians have gone there to fight as volunteers.
But following Eskandari’s death, a report in the Gulf
quoted Syrian opposition sources as saying that he
was the 60th Iranian “officer” to have been killed in
Syria.44 Iranian media sources have only reported
the deaths of 21 fighters in Syria since the beginning
of 2013. This reporting mostly takes the form of announcement of their funerals once the bodies have
been repatriated, which is usually done within 2 to 3
days of their deaths. Neither of these figures is substantial, in the context of the death toll in Syria’s civil
war, which is now put at over 150,000. Analysts estimate that approximately one-third of those casualties
have been incurred by forces fighting on the government side, whether regular or irregular.
Although there are variations in the exact terminology used, Iranians killed in Syria are almost always
described as defenders of the Shia shrines in Damascus, principally the shrine of Sayyidah Zaynab in the
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southern suburbs, but also that of Sayyidah Ruqayya
on the edge of the Old City.45 The term “defenders of
the shrine” is generic, and should not be taken as an
indication of geographic location of their deaths. In
most cases there are few details of the circumstances
in which they were killed. The fighters are also referred to as volunteers, but a study of the published
obituaries and eulogies, along with the photographs
that accompany them, shows that they almost all have
clear military connections.
While the Iranian authorities seem to impose no
restriction on the reporting of the deaths of Iranians in
Syria, they do seem sensitive to wider discussions or
revelations about the extent of Iran’s role in the conflict. On a number of occasions, news agencies have
withdrawn or modified reports related to the war. In
May 2014, Fars published a report in which a former
IRGC commander, Brigadier General Hoseyn Hamedani, spoke of Iranian support for Syria, saying that
“Iran has established a second Hezbollah in Syria,”
and “some 130,000 Basij volunteers have been trained
and are waiting to enter Syria.” Twenty-four hours
later the report had been removed from the website.
Earlier, in February, Fars removed a paragraph
from remarks by Member of Parliament (MP) Mahmud
Nabavian after they had been widely quoted by other
Iranian media outlets. Nabavian said, in the redacted
remarks: “We brought 150,000 Syrians to Iran and provided them with military training. We trained 150,000
over there and also sent 50,000 Hezbollah forces
there.” Subsequently, Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani told
a closed session of parliament that MPs should “exercise more caution” in their statements and “observe
security concerns.”46 It is worth pointing out that the
numbers quoted by Nabavian may be exaggerated.
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Western analysts estimate that Hezbollah has had no
more than about 5,000 troops in Syria at any one time,
while the strength of the Syrian paramilitary forces
trained by Iran is thought to be around 100,000.
Another instance occurred when the Anarma
website, based in Kerman Province, quoted an IRGC
commander as telling a local memorial ceremony in
March 2014: “Everybody saw when Commander Soleimani entered Syria; the enemy [the United States]
paid attention and did not talk about a military invasion against Syria anymore.” Ghasem Soleimani, as
the commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force, is responsible for external and special operations, and has been
described by opposition groups as the “de facto ruler”
in Damascus. Two days later, the website posted an
edited version of the report with the reference to Soleimani removed.47 Despite this apparent sensitivity
over the mention of Soleimani, he has been shown
a number of times in photographs attending the funerals of some of those killed in Syria or consoling
their families.
Iran may also be using Syria as a testing ground for
new technology. In September 2013, the Iranian military unveiled a range of new, domestically-produced
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which were shown
in reports on state television. First was the IRGC’s
combat-capable Shahed 129. The next day, the regular ground forces displayed three models, including
the Yasir, thought to be based on a U.S. drone which
Iran said it had captured in December 2012. As early
as November 2013, Syrian activists were posting videos to YouTube which appeared to show a Yasir being
flown over Damascus.48 And in December, the Al-Qaida-affiliated Al-Nusrah Front provided Al-Jazeera TV
with video footage of a Yasir it claimed to have shot
down over Aleppo.49
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Outlook: Prospects for Nuclear Talks.
Despite a visit to Iran by Director-general of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Yukiya
Amano in August 2014 being described by the Iranian Foreign Ministry as “constructive,” it is not clear
whether Iran and the West will be able to resolve the
standoff between the two sides over Tehran’s nuclear
program.50 While there exists a degree of optimism in
Rouhani’s moderate administration and the reformist media, most of the Iranian authorities, including
Supreme Leader Khamenei, and the majority of the
country’s prominent media outlets, have been highlighting “serious differences” that cast a shadow over
the prospects for a comprehensive agreement. Khamenei has repeatedly gone on record to declare his pessimism about the outcome of the negotiations, while
maintaining his support for the negotiating team led
by Zarif. Media outlets have echoed Khamenei, and
broad domestic support for a settlement is far from
guaranteed.
The Geneva deal raised hopes of the possibility of
a comprehensive agreement, but the more detailed
negotiations proved more challenging, with the two
sides failing to reach an accord by the July 20 deadline despite holding six rounds of marathon talks. As
a result, the deal was extended by a further 4 months,
to November 24, 2014—by which date a compromise
must be found. As part of the Geneva deal, Iran had
agreed to provide detailed information to the IAEA
about its nuclear program, with the agency then responding with questions. Although Iran says it has
answered all the questions transparently, some highranking officials have expressed frustration about
some of the agency’s new requests.

25

Following a meeting with Yukiya Amano in Tehran on August 17, 2014, Ali Akbar Salehi, the director
of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, said that
Iran had voiced its concern about the issue of exploding-bridgewire detonators (EBW), a crucial component for a nuclear weapons program. “There used to
be no more than two or three questions about EBW,
but they suddenly rose to 60 questions and we complained about this,” Salehi said.51 Reza Najafi, Iran’s
permanent representative at the IAEA, echoed Salehi’s remarks, criticizing the IAEA for making “some
illogical demands.”52
Opponents of the agreement took the opportunity
to voice pessimism over the negotiations. According
to conservative daily Hemayat:
With the arrival of Yukiya Amano in Tehran, there is
a serious question as to whether a new nuclear agreement with the agency is on the way. . . . Iran has successfully come to trust the IAEA, and now it is the
IAEA’s turn to adopt measures to create trust towards
Iran. This is because creating trust is a two-sided
game. If it cannot convince Iran to have cooperation, it
should not expect more cooperation from Iran.53

Previously, in May 2014, influential hardline daily
Keyhan had called it “indubitable” that the negotiations would “never have the desired conclusion” for
the Islamic Republic.
Iran has also accused Western powers of making
“excessive demands,” which it says have made the
negotiations more complex. Iran is particularly concerned about any questions with regard to its defense
and missile capabilities, defining such issues as its “red
lines” in the talks. “Negotiations on lifting the sanctions have led to no specific results,” Khamenei said
at a meeting with Iranian ambassadors and diplomats
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on August 13, 2014. Two days later, Iranian state TV
aired a 20-minute report about the prospects for the
talks, claiming that the two sides had failed to meet
the July deadline due to these “excessive demands”
by the West, specifically the United States:
As stated so many times by our officials, resolving
Iran’s nuclear program is not a complex issue, as long
as the U.S. recognizes Iran’s rights and, with its excessive demands, does not push the negotiations towards
failure once again.

Finally, on August 18, Zarif said that Iran would
not agree to a deal unless the P5+1 lifted all the sanctions on Tehran, something U.S. officials strongly oppose.54 Defiant messages also came from Majid TakhtRavanchi, a deputy foreign minister and a member of
the negotiating team, who called on Western powers
to drop “illusions”:
We have done all we could to resolve the nuclear
issue, and this is clear to the people of Iran and the
public opinion in the world, but we are not willing to
reach an agreement at any cost. Our flexibility has limits and we will negotiate based on the framework that
has been agreed.55

Despite the remaining differences, Iran and the P5+1
were scheduled to start a new round of talks on the
sidelines of the UN General Assembly session in September 2014.
Prospects for Agreement. . . .
Any comprehensive agreement by November 2014
would require significant concessions by both sides.
At the time of this writing, neither side is showing
27

willingness to reconsider its stance. Complete suspension of enrichment activities would be a politically
unviable move for Iran. This is because of the amount
of time and funds spent on the nuclear program to
date, and, more importantly, the heavy price paid by
the Iranian people for the program: enduring severe
sanctions, negative economic growth for 2 consecutive years and an unprecedented surge in inflation.
Even a significant scaling back of enrichment plans
would draw intense criticism not only from officials
and commentators, but also from ordinary people.
Although independent poll information to gauge the
views of the public on matters concerning national security does not exist in Iran, anecdotal evidence and
reporting suggest that the majority of Iranians, including many on the reformist camp, are strongly in favor
of the nuclear program. Any major concession by the
government would leave it in a fragile and shaky position, and the subject of outrage.
The transparency demanded by the international
community is in some respects problematic. Iran has
repeatedly said that it is willing to provide more transparency, but is deeply concerned about increasing its
vulnerability to possible military action by Israel or
the United States by giving away too many details of
its nuclear facilities. Besides the dubious prospect of a
comprehensive deal, another possible outcome could
be a further extension of talks. But this would risk favoring critics of Rouhani, who have consistently argued that the government is wasting time and money
on something which could never result in a desirable
outcome for the country. Some influential MPs have
warned that failure in talks would lead to Iran expanding its nuclear activities, and putting together a
plan for enriching uranium to 60 percent. That could
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have grave consequences for both Iran and the West,
as it might push Israel further toward air strikes on
the nuclear facilities.56 At the time of this writing,
it appeared that both sides were preparing for the
probable consequences of a no-deal scenario, despite
efforts to keep a positive tone about the prospects
for agreement.
. . . and Remaining Differences.
Major differences between the two sides were exposed during the more detailed negotiations which
followed the Joint Plan of Action. The level and volume of Iran’s enrichment program, the future of its
heavy water reactor in Arak, its research and development program, and finally the lifting of sanctions
were key areas of disagreement.
The number of Iran’s centrifuges is a major stumbling block in the talks. The West wishes Iran to reduce
its stock of centrifuges to numbers in the thousands,
while Iran demands numbers in the tens of thousands.
At the time of this writing, Iran had more than 19,000
installed enrichment centrifuges at its nuclear facilities, while continuing to maintain that it has the right
to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes and to deny
that the intention is to develop a nuclear weapon.
The major powers are also opposed to the installation of a new generation of centrifuges at Iran’s underground Natanz and Fordo enrichment plants. Iran,
however, argues that it has the right to pursue nuclear
research and development.
Iran’s suspected weapons research activities pose
another challenge. Iran has offered to implement the
Additional Protocol to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) if sanctions against it are lifted. The
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Additional Protocol requires IAEA member states
to provide an expanded declaration of their nuclear
activities and grant the watchdog more access to
their nuclear sites. Meanwhile, the West is already
requesting stricter international inspection and is not
satisfied with progress after Iranian agreement to
cooperate with the IAEA.
Another obstacle is Iran’s Arak heavy-water research reactor. The P5+1 is concerned that the project, once operational, could produce plutonium. Iran
maintains that Arak produces radio isotopes purely
for civilian purposes such as agriculture and medicine.
Some Iranian officials have said they are already trying to redesign the reactor to cut its potential output
and alleviate international concerns. In return, Iran
is demanding the swift lifting of sanctions imposed
on the country over the past 8 years. The additional
sanctions on Iranian oil exports and banks imposed
by the United States and the EU since 2012 have been
particularly damaging to the Iranian economy. However, coming up with a comprehensive plan to lift all
sanctions will be a major challenge for the West, especially given the ability of the U.S. Congress to block
their removal. The United States in particular faces a
major test in working out how to appease Israel in the
event of any outcome that could help Tehran maintain
its nuclear enrichment activities. For these reasons
among others, pessimists in Iran are concerned that it
may take years, even decades, for the sanctions to be
lifted in their entirety.
What Would a Comprehensive Deal Mean?
A comprehensive agreement over Iran’s nuclear
program could draw to a close a regional challenge
that has exercised the United States and the West
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over the past 2 decades. A final deal could help both
Iran and the West to normalize ties and cooperate on
various regional issues. This could include working
together on some of the adverse developments rapidly unfolding in the Middle East, including but not
limited to the emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq.
But an agreement which allowed Iran to continue
any form of nuclear development would be unsatisfactory for the Middle East’s only nuclear power,
Israel, which is demanding a total dismantling of
Iran’s nuclear program. Some Arab states, including
Saudi Arabia, are also deeply concerned about any
Iranian nuclear activity. A final agreement would be
a significant boost for Rouhani’s attempts to tackle
serious economic problems. The lifting of sanctions
that would follow would allow Iran to rebuild its seriously damaged economy, which in turn would favor
Rouhani’s own popularity.
A nuclear deal might not bring about radical social
or political change in Iran, but it could at least pave
the way for a beginning of reform in domestic politics.
Hardliners, as major opponents of Rouhani’s administration and the nuclear deal, could potentially be
further sidelined, and replaced by Rouhani’s camp of
reformists and moderate conservatives. Furthermore,
since Ayatollah Khamenei has hedged his bets over the
outcome of the talks, any possible agreement would
inevitably be portrayed as a success for him. Despite
strong criticism by ultra-conservatives, Iran’s negotiating team has so far enjoyed Khamenei’s support. But
it is not clear how long this support will last. Khamenei disapproved of the detente policy pursued during
the 1997-2005 presidency of the reformist Mohammad
Khatami, arguing that it only “emboldened” the West,
particularly over the nuclear dispute. Hardliners are
now already leveling the same charge at Rouhani.
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Risks of Failure.
Concern over the patience of conservative elements running out may already have been at the front
of Rouhani’s mind when he warned in September
2013 that the opportunity to reach an agreement over
Iran’s nuclear program is not “unlimited.”57 A total
failure in the nuclear negotiations would have serious
implications for all parties. Both sides in the talks have
already announced what could happen if the talks are
unsuccessful. “International sanctions will tighten and
Iran’s isolation will deepen,” warned U.S. Secretary of
State John Kerry in a Washington Post op-ed on June
30, 2014.58 Senior Iranian diplomats, such as Deputy
Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi, warned in return
that if the talks fail, Iran would resume production of
20 percent-enriched uranium, which was suspended
as part of the interim deal.59
Failure would also pose an immediate threat to
Rouhani’s administration at home, and thus to the
active engagement with the region and the world by
Iran that has been Rouhani’s policy since he took office in August 2013. The end of this incipient detente
could lead to a return to the confrontational style of
Rouhani’s predecessor, Mahmud Ahmadinejad.
Rouhani has been banking on a deal as a tool which
could transform the economy, allowing in foreign investors and lifting sanctions on Iranian banks. Failure
in the talks would thus not only be a foreign policy
failure and a blow to his moderate/reformist agenda,
but also a severe setback for Iran’s economy regardless of who is in power.
But ultra-conservative critics have already attacked
Rouhani for linking the country’s economic issues to
the removal of sanctions. Instead of trying to lift the
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sanctions, hardliners have called for implementation
of the “Resistance Economy.”60 The term denotes measures outlined by the Supreme Leader aimed at modifying the economy to reduce its vulnerability to sanctions. Once again, in the event of failure, Rouhani’s
position would be undermined and the advocates of
the Resistance Economy would be reinforced.
In effect, to the extent that Rouhani’s supporters
and the Iranian public as a whole are putting their
trust in Rouhani to deliver a deal with the West and
thus resolve Iran’s economic crisis, there is a realistic prospect of a continued trajectory toward reform
and engagement. Conversely, that trust will not
last indefinitely; a failure by Rouhani, and consequent continued economic trauma, could lead Iran
down a regressive and potentially unpredictable and
dangerous path.
Outlook and Policy Implications.
The United States and Iran do have common security interests, especially at the present time. The fight
against terrorism, stability in Afghanistan, and peace
in Iraq are all prime Iranian concerns. But for the time
being, the nuclear problem appears once again to provide a block to effective engagement on shared concerns as well as to progress in all other foreign policy
issues. At present, therefore, all hinges on the progress
or lack of it of nuclear talks.
In the Iranian domestic debate, the nuclear program is an intensely politicized issue. It feeds off antagonism between Iran and the United States, which
in turn exacerbates the political importance of nuclear
development still further. If either one of these two factors were removed, the vicious cycle would collapse,
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and the prospect of enhanced cooperation between
the United States and Iran for the sake of regional security would open. But this would require a strategic
shift on both sides.
Given U.S. demands that Iran reduce its capacity
to enrich uranium—and keep it reduced for a period
of decades—the concessions required on either side to
reach an agreement would be difficult and painful, and
at the time of writing, neither side appeared willing to
rise to the challenge. Indeed, both sides are prevented
by domestic circumstances from reaching agreement.
Iran needs to present any agreement as a victory to its
domestic audience. There cannot be any appearance
of significant concessions. The United States, too, cannot appear to back down not only because of its strategic position, or the effect on relations with key allies
in the region, but also because of Israeli influence on
U.S. foreign policy and the requirement for a deal to
pass through Congress, famously described as “535
U.S. Secretaries of State, each with their own views.”
Recent developments appear to favor both sides
equally. The dramatically improved domestic U.S. oil
production makes it easier to place sanctions on Iranian oil exports with a much reduced risk of intolerable
price increases as a result. Conversely, after the easing
of sanctions, Iran believes its reinvigorated economy
to be stronger and more resilient to any renewed sanctions that might be imposed in the future. At the same
time, there is a belief that the simultaneous crises of
Ukraine and the Islamic State have weakened the
United States.
Arguing that the real issue is between Washington
and Tehran, Dr Gary Samore, former White House
Coordinator for Arms Control and Weapons of Mass
Destruction, points to the bilateral talks as a “more
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sensible process for negotiation” than the P5+1, which
he says holds “ceremonial sessions” which are too
cumbersome to reach real decisions.61 In any case, the
Ukraine crisis has undermined the P5+1 negotiation
format; Iran can proceed with much more confidence,
since if talks collapse, the United States and Europe
would not be able to reach agreement within that
framework on reconstructing sanctions.
Domestic support for Rouhani will continue to
be fragile. Influential critics disapprove both of his
nuclear and foreign policy ambitions, but also of
his attempts to ease social and political conditions
at home.62 Consideration of concessions to achieve
nuclear agreement should include awareness of the
potential adverse consequences of failure, including
the potential for a more adversarial and unpredictable
Iran as detailed above.
Supporting greater engagement between Iran and
its neighboring Arab Gulf monarchies would be advantageous to the U.S. involvement in the region. The
implications of an Iran-West detente are profound
for the security strategies of the GCC states, a group
of key U.S. allies deeply concerned about a potential
threat from Iran. At the same time, it is essential to
bear in mind that U.S. behavior toward Iran is watched
very closely in Arab Gulf capitals, and perceived missteps—or compromises over Gulf security—would be
likely to have immediate adverse consequences for
U.S. relations in the region.
Iranian support for efforts against the Islamic State
would undoubtedly boost U.S. efforts to subdue this
threat. But temporary unity against a common enemy
provides a fragile basis for a lasting relationship. Either side would view an alliance against the Islamic
State with ambiguity, and all sides would retain their
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own motivations for independent action, leading to
an alignment fraught with suspicion.63 A historical
parallel is the Soviet Union finding, against its will,
common cause with the Western Allies during World
War II. The extent to which the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was pursuing its own agenda became clear immediately after the common enemy was
defeated, leading directly to an era of even greater
confrontation.
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